We would like to dedicate this review to our client, the late Orens Goldberger, who, sadly, passed away prematurely and did not live to see the legal precedent established in his honor—a precedent that has made a significant contribution to the protection of the insured public.
Laurence Goldberger's car was stolen while his wife was loading potted plants into it.
The vehicle was insured by the insurance company Direct Insurance.
Naturally, a person loading potted plants into a car turns his head to the side from time to time.
The thief took advantage of that split second—as Direct Insurance surmised—to get into the car, start it with the key in the ignition, and drive off.
Instead of paying the insurance benefits, Direct Insurance reprimanded the policyholder for failing to comply with the security requirements: leaving the keys in the car while it was unattended. Therefore, you are not entitled to insurance benefits.
Direct Insurance therefore rejected Goldberger's claim.
Goldberger filed a complaint against Direct Insurance with the Insurance Commissioner.
Staff members of the Public Inquiries Unit at the Inspector General’s Office, headed by Attorney Rachel Ratovitz, conducted an in-depth review of the findings and supporting documents and examined the parties" arguments. Ultimately, they issued a general directive stating that in cases such as these, the vehicle is in fact considered to be occupied. Consequently, there is no obligation to activate the protective measures.
Direct Insurance did not comply with the Superintendent’s general directive. Direct Insurance justified this by arguing that the Superintendent is not authorized to rule on legal matters.
This is, of course, an argument that our sages would have dismissed as mere idle talk. For if, when ruling on a complaint brought before him, the inspector is not authorized to address legal questions, what is he authorized to address—philosophical questions? Without the ability to rule on legal questions, the inspector is, in effect, powerless.
Indeed, this was also the view of Judge Sara Dotan of the Tel Aviv District Court, before whom the dispute was brought.
The judge noted that Direct Insurance is attempting to limit the regulator’s powers. Such a reduction would allow insurance companies to operate more freely. However, such a restriction would nullify oversight of the insurance industry and render supervision meaningless.
The relationship between insurance companies and policyholders is characterized by an inherent lack of equality, an imbalance of power, and information asymmetries.
Insured individuals often find themselves high and dry when insurance claims arise. Insurance companies, to which they have paid substantial premiums, turn them away empty-handed.
For this reason, the legislature established a mechanism in the Supervision Act for the prompt and effective investigation of complaints. This mechanism was entrusted to the supervisor.
The judge believes that the complaint review mechanism cannot be limited in its powers. There can be no doubt that the supervisor is authorized to rule on complaints based on legal norms and, in doing so, even to establish new legal norms. The investigation of complaints regarding insurance matters cannot be conducted without relying on the various insurance laws, interpreting the policies, and exercising discretion with respect to the relevant facts.
This was the case regarding the issue of who was in the vehicle. After reviewing numerous precedents from various courts, the inspector concluded that it is unreasonable to consider an insured person who is standing next to his vehicle and loading items into it as not being in the vehicle.
The same applies to the question of leaving the keys in the vehicle’s ignition. The policy did not contain a provision explicitly stating that the insured must remove the key from the ignition, even when the vehicle is occupied. The Commissioner concluded that the company cannot retroactively invoke this exemption.
The Commissioner further ruled that insurance companies should not be allowed to claim that they are exempt from payment due to the insured’s negligence or contributory negligence on his or her part. After all, the purpose of establishing the standard auto insurance policy is to provide protection to the insured, even against his or her own negligence.
All of these are policy decisions regarding how, in the Commissioner’s view, insurance companies should proceed in cases where a vehicle is stolen while the insured is standing next to it. After all, formulating policies regarding the implementation of the standard auto insurance policy is one of the Superintendent’s primary responsibilities.
In fact, Judge Dothan clarifies that the inspector has authority that even exceeds that of the court. The court acts only upon a party’s petition. In contrast, the inspector is authorized to correct deficiencies on his own initiative, even without a complaint.
Within the scope of his broad authority, the Commissioner is authorized to intervene in the contractual relationships between insurance companies and policyholders through a general regulation, To interpret the provisions of the insurance contract and, through this interpretation, to establish the appropriate standards governing the relationship between the insurer and the insured.
The inspector’s authority is not limited solely to establishing the facts or ordering the correction of deficiencies. He must fulfill the purpose of the law that authorizes him and bring about the resolution of the dispute while supervising and reviewing the conduct of insurance companies. In order to fulfill his role, the supervisor is certainly entitled to exercise legal discretion.
At the end of the day, the judge ruled, the supervisor’s directive is binding on Direct Insurance.
Note: This appeal was heard jointly with an appeal filed by the Clal Insurance Company against the Superintendent’s decision to require it to pay out on the death of an insured person under a group life insurance policy. The insured passed away at age 68, and the insurance term ended at age 65. Nevertheless, the Commissioner required Clal to pay the insurance benefit, in part because Clal continued to collect insurance premiums and failed to inform the insured of the termination of the insurance period at age 65.
Judge Sarah Dotan dismissed Klal's appeal on the same grounds set forth above, which establish that the supervisor had the authority to rule as he did.
Clal Insurance filed a motion for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court. Justice Edna Arbel denied the motion and upheld Justice Dothan’s decision.
The full judgment cited in the title also includes the Supreme Court’s decision.