We would like to dedicate this review to a client of our firm, the late Rachel Piamente, a woman whose courage was described with such great humanity by the Honorable Justice Edna Arbel as someone who "clung to life with all her might and never let go.".
"Evil," writes Ilana Shila in her essay *Allegories of Evil*, "is traditionally represented in culture as an external force that invades the normality of everyday life and disrupts it. Franz Kafka presented a different portrayal of evil—one that is more precise and terrifying. It is an evil that grows out of normality and is carried out by small, somewhat ridiculous people.".
On her deathbed, Rachel implored us to fight against the stain of deceit that had been cast upon her and not to compromise. We have carried out her last wish.
The British Mandate left a deep mark on the Israeli legal system, including in the field of insurance.
Our judges have adopted the English legal principle, which allows insurance companies to engage in what is known in professional jargon as “retrospective underwriting” or “claims underwriting.”.
What does that mean? Take life insurance, for example: instead of bearing the costs of medical underwriters—who would ask insurance applicants clear questions about their medical condition before issuing a policy—insurance companies preferred to sell policies while minimizing the questions and, at times, without asking anything at all. The companies collected premiums for years—sometimes decades—and only upon the insured’s death did they examine the medical records to determine whether the person would have been eligible for coverage.
If any medical condition was discovered, insurance companies would refuse to pay the insurance benefit.
The beneficiaries have no choice but to grow old within the walls of the courtroom, trying to determine why the deceased did not answer questions the insurance company did not ask.
Many policyholders chose to settle and forgo substantial sums. The insurance companies pocketed enormous profits.
This cynical behavior troubled elected officials. "According to English case law adopted in Israel," as stated in the explanatory memorandum to the 1981 Insurance Bill, "the insured is obligated not only to answer the insurer’s questions but also to inform the insurer—even if not asked—of any material fact; otherwise, he will forfeit his right to insurance benefits. This rule has often led to complicated litigation and thwarted the claims of unsuspecting policyholders. The proposed law is based on the assumption that an insurance company with experience in thousands of transactions knows—or should know—what it needs to ask and what may be important to its case.".
In keeping with this approach, the Insurance Contract Bill stipulates that the insurance company must conduct underwriting before issuing the policy, including by presenting clear written questions to the insured.
However, insurance companies did not give up so quickly on the option of retroactive underwriting. They managed to persuade the bill’s sponsors to add a provision requiring the insured to answer even questions that were not presented to him. This obligation was dubbed the "proactive duty of disclosure." It is the very obligation that allows insurance companies to conduct underwriting at the time of a claim—the very obligation that the Insurance Bill sought to abolish.
And so, in almost every case, the insurance company raises the argument: "Even though I didn’t ask you, why didn’t you tell me?".
According to the wording of the law, an insurance company can succeed in this claim only if it proves that the information was withheld with fraudulent intent. Therefore, in every case, the insurance company tries to label the insured as a fraudster. If it fails to label the insured as a fraudster, it will, at most, pay the insurance amount in court. But in the meantime, along the way, out of tens of thousands of beneficiaries, many will be broken.
The Supreme Court is currently deliberating on the scope of that duty of proactive disclosure.
Rachel and Aaron Piamente received a loan from Tefahot Bank. As a condition of receiving the loan, the bank insured the couple under a joint group life insurance policy with the insurance companies Elihu, Eitan, Clal, and Shiloh.
Two years after the policy was issued, Rachel died of cancer.
The insurance companies, led by Eliyahu, refused to pay the insurance benefits. From the deceased’s medical records, Eliyahu learned that she had been suffering from cancer for about two years prior to taking out the insurance policy. Eliyahu acknowledged that the couple was not required to complete a health declaration before taking out the insurance. Eliyahu relied on the duty of proactive disclosure. According to Eliyahu, the Piamente couple should have disclosed the illness to her on their own initiative.
Tel Aviv District Court Judge Nissim Yeshayahu ruled that the deceased had indeed suffered from cancer two years before taking out the insurance policy. However, she had undergone treatment and was in remission at the time the policy was issued. The disease recurred only about three months after the policy was issued. Only then did the couple realize that the disease had reached an advanced and terminal stage.
The judge was not convinced that the couple had concealed the decedent’s illness from Eliyahu with the intent to defraud in order to receive the proceeds of the policy. He therefore ordered the four insurers to pay the decedent’s heirs the full amount of the insurance proceeds.
Eliyahu filed an appeal with the Supreme Court, and the ruling was handed down by Justice Edna Arbel, with the concurrence of Justices Eliezer Rivlin and Ayala Procaccia.
Judge Arbel notes that, over the years, the means available to insurance companies for obtaining the information they need to assess risks have become more sophisticated, and their ability to assess the expected risk on their own has improved. For these reasons, the duty of disclosure currently imposed on the insured has been limited to providing answers to questions that the insurance company presents to the insured in writing. In the case at hand, Eliyahu did not present any questions to the couple. Therefore, it cannot rely on this duty.
Indeed, the judge states, there is also a duty of proactive disclosure, and some believe it should be abolished entirely. In any case, the duty of proactive disclosure—even according to those who support it—is limited, and the burden of proving it is heavy and difficult.
To succeed in this, the insurance company must prove that the insured acted with the knowledge that the concealed fact was a material matter for the insurance company. It must prove that the insured acted with fraudulent intent, driven by a negative motive to obtain insurance coverage, knowing that if he did not conceal the information, he would not receive insurance coverage. It must further prove that the failure to disclose carries a moral stigma, and that the insured took steps to conceal the information in order to prevent the insurance company from becoming aware of it.
"Did the Piamenta couple intentionally and fraudulently refrain from providing Eliyahu with information about Rachel's illness?" the judge asked.
At this point, Justice Arbel adopts Justice Yeshayahu’s findings and conclusions. They are supported by the evidence and stand up to logical scrutiny, the justice states. Following the treatments the decedent underwent, all markers indicating the onset of the disease had subsided, and there was no evidence of metastatic disease in the decedent prior to taking out the insurance policy.
Not only that, the judge ruled. The husband had mentioned the decedent’s illness to bank representatives on at least two occasions. He was told that this matter was irrelevant for the purposes of taking out the insurance. Although the husband did not inquire further as to why the insurers were not interested in details regarding the decedent’s illness, in the judge’s opinion, he was not required to do so in light of the responses he received.
The judge also rejected Eliyahu’s alternative argument that, at the time the policy was issued, the decedent was already suffering from a terminal illness. Insurance does not cover an event that has already occurred, Eliyahu explained.
"The body of evidence," the judge replied, "shows that at the time the policy was drawn up, the couple believed that the decedent’s illness was in remission. Their conduct suggests the beginning of a new chapter, with the hope that the illness was a thing of the past.".
According to the insurance companies, the judge clarifies, "The serious illness should have hung like a cloud over the couple’s heads. I cannot accept that… The deceased clung to life with all her might and never let go…A person fighting for their life, when faced with such a real and tangible danger… and who is finally told that the illness has disappeared from their body, will naturally seek to erase the difficult past, make new plans, and look forward to the future with hope. The implication of the insurers" position is that such a person must live their life in the shadow of fear, with a constant sense that the disease is lurking at any moment. This view should not be encouraged. It is neither desirable nor appropriate. It is undesirable because it leaves no room for hope. It is inappropriate because it does not align with human nature. Life experience teaches us that it is human nature to cling to optimistic expectations, even if they sometimes do not correspond to the objective information at one’s disposal.”.
At the conclusion of the proceedings, the Supreme Court unanimously ordered the insurance companies Eliyahu Eitan, Clal, and Shiloh to pay the full insurance amounts to the heirs of the late Rachel Piamente and also ordered them to pay attorneys’ fees and court costs.
As a side note—and in fact, at the very heart of the matter—we note that the ruling handed down by Justice Arbel is one of the most significant rulings in the field of insurance and represents a conceptual breakthrough, a departure from the views of the old English law (which has also undergone changes) that saw its role as intended to protect insurance companies, and an application of the principles of the Israeli Insurance Contract Law, which is based on the consumer-oriented principles of Swiss law.
For example, the judge describes the "profound imbalance of power between the insurer—a highly experienced and financially sound professional entity—and the insured, who lacks professional expertise in the field of insurance." This fact, as well as "the fact that the subject matter of the contract is an abstract, intangible commodity, the precise nature of which is not necessarily clear to the insured until after the insured event occurs; the fact that, in most cases, an insurance contract is a standard form contract whose content is dictated by the insurer, while the insured has no real ability to influence that content; the complexity of the insurance contract and its use of technical terms and phrasing whose meaning is not clear to those who do not possess the appropriate professional qualifications and experience," All of these factors, along with additional characteristics, lead to the situation where "in not a few cases, the insured only becomes fully aware of the contract’s contents after the insured event has occurred." All of these factors combined mean that there is no certainty that the insured is aware of the provisions of the insurance contract and fully understands them. All of these factors constitute the inherent inequality in the relationship between the insured and the insurer. The inherent inequality in the insurance contract is at the heart of the consumer-protective purpose of the law—a purpose aimed at safeguarding the insured public against the insurer’s excessive power, both economic and professional.”.
The judge ruled that insurance companies are not permitted to rely on a duty of disclosure based on the principle of good faith, as found in other areas of law. "The legislature clearly expressed its intent in the law to strengthen the insured’s position and provide him with maximum protection against the insurer’s excessive power. Allowing the insurer to rely on the good faith provision in Section 12(b) of the Contracts Law—and thereby impose on the insured a duty of disclosure significantly broader than what the legislature intended— is contrary to the legislature’s intent and renders it meaningless. It would allow insurance benefits to be denied to an insured even in cases where it does not appear that he acted with fraudulent intent, as required by the legislature, and I see no justification for this.".
In contrast, the judge states, the duty of good faith imposes a duty of disclosure on insurance companies toward the insured. "The insurer is obligated to fully disclose the details of the insurance policy in order to enable the insured to make an informed decision regarding whether to enter into the insurance contract and to prevent a situation in which the insured’s expectations from the insurance contract bear no relation to what the contract actually provides. The insurer’s duty of disclosure also includes the obligation to ensure that the insured is aware of the terms of the insurance contract, including exclusions from insurance coverage; otherwise, the insurer cannot rely on these exclusions…An insurer seeking to limit its liability must do so explicitly and bring the limitations on insurance coverage to the insured’s attention; otherwise, the insurer cannot claim that a limitation on insurance coverage applies.".
In addition, Justice Arbel notes "the position that it is appropriate to apply norms from public law to insurers, given the unique nature of the insurance contract and the fact that certain branches of insurance have a distinctly public character…This position is consistent with the current trend in our legal system of applying fundamental principles from the field of public law to entities operating in the realm of private law through doctrines drawn from public law.".
As we said, this is one of the most important—and, if we may add, most humane—rulings in our field, and anyone who doesn’t read the original text is missing out.
Note: The Piamenta ruling was selected in 2108 by The ynet website As the ruling that has had the greatest impact on Israeli insurance law and as one of the seven rulings that shaped Israeli law during the first 70 years of the State’s existence.